Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods

DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0879-2zbMath1341.91012OpenAlexW2038792974MaRDI QIDQ904830

Hakan İnal

Publication date: 14 January 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0879-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015) ⋮ Robust equilibria in tournaments ⋮ Rationing rules and stable coalition structures ⋮ The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games ⋮ Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching ⋮ An empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic games

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