Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice

DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0882-7zbMath1341.91071OpenAlexW3122379648MaRDI QIDQ904833

Muhammad Mahajne, Shmuel Nitzan, Oscar Volij

Publication date: 14 January 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0882-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Pairwise consensus and the Borda rule ⋮ Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms ⋮ Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones? ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

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