Consistency of the Shapley NTU value in \(G\)-hyperplane games

DOI10.1007/s10058-015-0172-yzbMath1329.91011OpenAlexW909533566MaRDI QIDQ905165

E. Romero-Palacios, Miguel A. Hinojosa, José Manuel Zarzuelo

Publication date: 14 January 2016

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0172-y

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyShapley valueNTU gamesShapley NTU value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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