The informational basis of scoring rules
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Publication:905166
DOI10.1007/s10058-015-0176-7zbMath1329.91035OpenAlexW922722679MaRDI QIDQ905166
Matías Núñez, Giacomo Valletta
Publication date: 14 January 2016
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0176-7
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