The optimal design of rewards in contests

DOI10.1007/S10058-015-0179-4zbMath1329.91052OpenAlexW3123855500WikidataQ57921789 ScholiaQ57921789MaRDI QIDQ905170

David Wettstein, Todd R. Kaplan

Publication date: 14 January 2016

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0179-4

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionscontestsinnovationmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Contests with rank-order spillovers
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• All-Pay Contests
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Optimal Contracts for Experimentation

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