The strong price of anarchy of linear bottleneck congestion games

DOI10.1007/s00224-014-9598-9zbMath1409.91012OpenAlexW2085695690MaRDI QIDQ905688

Guido Schäfer, Bart de Keijzer, Orestis A. Telelis

Publication date: 28 January 2016

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/24020

zbMATH Keywords

congestion gamesprice of anarchyalgorithmic game theorystrong equilibriainefficiency of equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

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