Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem

DOI10.1007/s00285-015-0889-9zbMath1354.92051arXiv1408.6501OpenAlexW3100165689WikidataQ50924250 ScholiaQ50924250MaRDI QIDQ907125

Fabio A. C. C. Chalub, Max O. Souza

Publication date: 2 February 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.6501

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsbirth-death processesfixation probabilityasymptotic approximations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Applications of branching processes (60J85) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Asymptotic approximations, asymptotic expansions (steepest descent, etc.) (41A60) Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Numerical integration (65D30)

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