Subjective probabilities need not be sharp
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Publication:907890
DOI10.1007/s10670-013-9597-2zbMath1329.03036OpenAlexW2074250661MaRDI QIDQ907890
Publication date: 27 January 2016
Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://philarchive.org/rec/CHASPN
Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Decision theory (91B06) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)
Related Items (9)
You've come a long way, Bayesians ⋮ Acting on belief functions ⋮ Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences ⋮ On the imprecision of full conditional probabilities ⋮ Tracking probabilistic truths: a logic for statistical learning ⋮ Uncertainty, equality, fraternity ⋮ Vague credence ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Imprecise Probabilities and Unstable Betting Behaviour
Cites Work
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- Decision making under uncertainty using imprecise probabilities
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity
- Dilation for sets of probabilities
- A survey of the theory of coherent lower previsions
- Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
- The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
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