Rationalizable signaling

DOI10.1007/s10670-013-9462-3zbMath1329.91023OpenAlexW3193076391MaRDI QIDQ907896

Gerhard Jäger

Publication date: 27 January 2016

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9462-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Ambiguity advantage under meaning activation ⋮ Ambiguity Preference and Context Learning in Uncertain Signaling

Cites Work

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• Probability Theory

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