Probe and adjust in information transfer games

DOI10.1007/s10670-013-9467-yzbMath1329.91019OpenAlexW2064276506MaRDI QIDQ907902

Kevin J. S. Zollman, Brian Skyrms, Simon M. Huttegger

Publication date: 27 January 2016

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9467-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (1)

A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games

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