Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game

DOI10.3934/jdg.2015002zbMath1391.91102OpenAlexW2525500444WikidataQ59973543 ScholiaQ59973543MaRDI QIDQ908178

David Cantala, Juan Sebastián Pereyra

Publication date: 3 February 2016

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2015002

zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriumindivisibilityassignment gametop trading cyclesauction mechanismendogenous budget constraint

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• Strong Core and Competitive Equilibria of an Exchange Market with Indivisible Goods
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
• House allocation with transfers

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