Paths to stability in the assignment problem
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Publication:908181
DOI10.3934/jdg.2015004zbMath1391.91131OpenAlexW2211699561WikidataQ59973550 ScholiaQ59973550MaRDI QIDQ908181
Publication date: 3 February 2016
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2015004
Related Items (10)
Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games ⋮ Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core ⋮ Stochastic stability in assignment problems ⋮ Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching ⋮ The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets ⋮ Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
Cites Work
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- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
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- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Solutions for the Stable Roommates Problem with Payments
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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