A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts

DOI10.3934/jdg.2015005zbMath1391.91132OpenAlexW2527190193WikidataQ59973553 ScholiaQ59973553MaRDI QIDQ908183

Eliana Pepa Risma

Publication date: 3 February 2016

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2015005

zbMATH Keywords

latticealgorithmoptimalstable allocationquasi-stable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations

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