Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor

DOI10.3934/jdg.2015009zbMath1391.91133OpenAlexW2527104209WikidataQ59973560 ScholiaQ59973560MaRDI QIDQ908186

Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 3 February 2016

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2015009

zbMATH Keywords

market designstable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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