Dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90090-7zbMath0693.90014OpenAlexW2050296671MaRDI QIDQ908830

Hiroshi Osano

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90090-7

zbMATH Keywords

labor marketserial correlationsdistortion of employmentexogenous demand shocktwo-period, asymmetric information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

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• A note on overemployment/underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information
• Underemployment with liquidity-constrained multi-period firms
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis

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