Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90012-9zbMath0694.90097OpenAlexW2014794908MaRDI QIDQ909587

Daniel J. Seidmann

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90012-9

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Communication, information (94A99)

Related Items (10)

The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games ⋮ Communication in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information ⋮ Value of public information in sender-receiver games ⋮ Refining cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information ⋮ Professional advice ⋮ Informal communication ⋮ Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources ⋮ Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games

Cites Work

• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• A Theory of Credibility
• Strategic Information Transmission

This page was built for publication: Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests