Coherent behavior in noncooperative games
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Publication:909589
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90011-8zbMath0694.90100OpenAlexW2021002963MaRDI QIDQ909589
Robert F. Nau, Kevin F. McCardle
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90011-8
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