Coherent behavior in noncooperative games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90011-8zbMath0694.90100OpenAlexW2021002963MaRDI QIDQ909589

Robert F. Nau, Kevin F. McCardle

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90011-8

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative gamesjoint coherencemutually expected rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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