Subjective evaluations of n-person games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90007-7zbMath0694.90103OpenAlexW2065233020MaRDI QIDQ909591

Douglas H. Blair, Richard P. McLean

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90007-7

zbMATH Keywords

subjective expected utilitysimple gamesaxiomatizationprobabilistic valuesemi-valuesShapley and Banzhaf values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (3)

Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom ⋮ The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity ⋮ SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER

Cites Work

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• Utility functions for simple games
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Semivalues of Simple Games
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• Citizen Voting Power Under the Electoral College: A Stochastic Model Based on State Voting Patterns
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• A Mixture-Set Axiomatization of Conditional Subjective Expected Utility
• An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility

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