Feedback Nash equilibria in a problem of optimal fishery management

DOI10.1007/BF00939450zbMath0695.90027OpenAlexW2040091663MaRDI QIDQ910330

Gerhard Sorger, Steffen Jørgensen

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00939450

zbMATH Keywords

infinite horizonfishery gameMyopic open- loop finite horizon equilibriaNash equilibrium controls

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Ecology (92D40)

Related Items (6)

On differential games with a feedback Nash equilibrium ⋮ Optimal investment and finance in renewable resource harvesting ⋮ A differential game model of a market of substitutable products ⋮ Stochastic differential game model of a common property fishery ⋮ A class of differential games which admits a feedback solution with linear value functions ⋮ Equilibria in a stochastic resource management game under imperfect information

Cites Work

• Dynamic common property resources and environmental problems
• Nonuniqueness of no-memory feedback equilibria in a fishery resource game
• Differential game models in management science
• On the Economics of International Fisheries
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Feedback Nash equilibria in a problem of optimal fishery management