Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods

DOI10.1007/BF01832916zbMath0696.90003MaRDI QIDQ911433

Georges Bordes, Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsprivate goodsArrow functionArrow social welfare functionexistence of a dictatorhypersaturating domainsultrasaturating domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

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• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions