On the order of eliminating dominated strategies

DOI10.1016/0167-6377(90)90046-8zbMath0696.90091OpenAlexW1969363584MaRDI QIDQ911490

Itzhak Gilboa, Ehud Kalai, Eitan Zemel

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/789.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

reduced gamedominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (15)

Responsive and strong responsive evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Game theory with translucent players ⋮ The computational complexity of iterated elimination of dominated strategies ⋮ Order independence for iterated weak dominance ⋮ Rationalizability and logical inference ⋮ Iterated bounded dominance ⋮ Order independence for rationalizability ⋮ Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A NORMAL-FORM GAME AND ITS SUBGAMES ⋮ Iterated strict dominance in general games ⋮ Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility ⋮ Iterative information update and stability of strategies ⋮ Dominance rationality: a unified approach ⋮ Comparing the notions of optimality in CP-nets, strategic games and soft constraints

Cites Work

• A note on strategy elimination in bimatrix games
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
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