Corrigendum to: ``Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90093-8zbMath0696.90096OpenAlexW4240269613MaRDI QIDQ911491

Rangarajan K. Sundaram

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90093-8

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gameperfect equilibriumcommon-property resourcescompact state spacedeterministic transition functionexistence of a symmetric stationary equilibriuminstantaneous utility functionoligopolistic exploitation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

A note on topological aspects in dynamic games of resource extraction and economic growth theory ⋮ Existence of Nash equilibria in stochastic games of resource extraction with risk-sensitive players

Cites Work

• Nonpaternalistic intergenerational altruism
• Economic Growth with Intergenerational Altruism

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