On the saddle-point stability for a class of dynamic games

DOI10.1007/BF00940475zbMath0696.90097OpenAlexW2002331932MaRDI QIDQ911492

Harutaka Takahashi, Engelbert J. Dockner

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00940475

zbMATH Keywords

saddle-pointstability propertiescontinuous-timecapital accumulation gamesopen-loop Nash equilibrium solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete-time games (91A50) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Discrete-time control/observation systems (93C55) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Asymptotic stability in control theory (93D20)

Related Items (6)

How to do comparative dynamics on the back of an envelope for open‐loop Nash equilibria in differential game theory ⋮ Stabilization of capital accumulation games ⋮ A qualitative characterization of symmetric open-loop Nash equilibria in discounted infinite horizon differential games ⋮ Anticipation in innovative investment under oligopolistic competition ⋮ Potential difference games and applications ⋮ Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Capital accumulation games of infinite duration
• Competitive equilibrium cycles
• Turnpike properties of capital accumulation games
• The Hopf bifurcation and the existence and stability of closed orbits in multisector models of optimal economic growth
• Dynamic limit pricing, barriers to entry, and rational firms
• Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model
• State equation, controllability, and maximal matchings of petri nets
• Stability of Separable Hamiltonians and Investment Theory
• The General Instability of a Class of Competitive Growth Processes
• Generalization of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

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