Self enforceable paths in extensive form games
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Publication:912006
DOI10.1007/BF00134105zbMath0697.90090OpenAlexW122765058MaRDI QIDQ912006
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134105
Related Items (4)
A theory of forward induction in finitely repeated games ⋮ Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games ⋮ Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing ⋮ Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
Cites Work
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Non-cooperative games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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