A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
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Publication:912008
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90118-XzbMath0697.90093MaRDI QIDQ912008
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Raymond J. Deneckere
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (12)
Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights ⋮ Sequential bargaining with common values ⋮ Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game ⋮ Bilateral trading and incomplete information: price convergence in a small market ⋮ Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation ⋮ Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling ⋮ Equity bargaining with common value ⋮ Sequential bargaining, external effects of agreement, and public intervention ⋮ The role of commitment in bilateral trade ⋮ Efficient allocation with continuous quantities ⋮ Price skimming: commitment and delay in bargaining with outside option ⋮ Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining
Cites Work
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- Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty
- A Multistage Model of Bargaining
- Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Strategic Delay in Bargaining
- Bargaining Under Two-Sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers Case
- Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
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