Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(88)90051-0zbMath0699.90006OpenAlexW2054357810MaRDI QIDQ913620

Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga, Joël Moulen

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90051-0

zbMATH Keywords

representabilitystability conditionscorecollective choice rulebinary game in constitutional formc-social decision function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

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• Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
• A Social Choice Interpretation of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Game