Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
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Publication:913628
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90048-OzbMath0699.90015WikidataQ56481616 ScholiaQ56481616MaRDI QIDQ913628
Drew Fudenberg, Bengt Holmstrom, Paul R. Milgrom
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (30)
Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion ⋮ Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment ⋮ Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency ⋮ Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach ⋮ Staged financing: a trade-off theory of holdup and option value ⋮ Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency ⋮ Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting ⋮ Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit? ⋮ A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model ⋮ Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment ⋮ A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity ⋮ Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard ⋮ Principal-Agent Models ⋮ Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats ⋮ Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs ⋮ Endogenous market incompleteness with investment risks ⋮ Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference ⋮ Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement ⋮ Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states ⋮ Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions ⋮ On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information ⋮ Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks ⋮ Optimization models for salesforce compensation ⋮ The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency ⋮ Optimal retention in agency problems ⋮ DEA models for two decision makers with conflicts: the principal-agent problem ⋮ Markets with endogenous uncertainty theory and policy ⋮ Retained earnings, interest rates and lending relationship ⋮ The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields ⋮ Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts
Cites Work
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- Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
- Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
- Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
- A Theory of Wage Dynamics
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