``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties

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Publication:913683

DOI10.1007/BF01753708zbMath0699.90109MaRDI QIDQ913683

John H. Nachbar

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)




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