On the logic of ``agreeing to disagree type results

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90057-QzbMath0703.90098OpenAlexW2007835863MaRDI QIDQ916579

Asher Wolinsky, Ariel Rubinstein

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90057-q

zbMATH Keywords

agreeing to disagreenon-partitional information structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items

Awareness and partitional information structures, The incoherence of agreeing to disagree, ``Agreeing to disagree type results under ambiguity, Belief consistency and trade consistency, ``Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic approach., Unnamed Item, The possibility of speculative trade between dynamically consistent agents., Information-based trade, Agreeing to disagree and dilation, The positive foundation of the common prior assumption, Agreeing to disagree in infinite information structures, On the nonexistence of universal information structures, A simplicial complex model for dynamic epistemic logic to study distributed task computability, Information, trade and incomplete markets, Biased information and the exchange paradox, Rational expectations can preclude trades, Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors, Unawareness and partitional information structures, PEOPLE WITH COMMON PRIORS CAN AGREE TO DISAGREE, Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information, On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief, Do I know \(\Omega \)? An I iomatic model of awareness and knowledge

Cites Work

• Learning to agree
• Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Agreeing to disagree
• Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree