Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90083-VzbMath0703.90108OpenAlexW2087637200MaRDI QIDQ916580

Martin J. Osborne

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90083-v

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficientrepeated game of coordinationsequences of one-shot Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (10)

Inefficient stage Nash is not stable ⋮ A theory of forward induction in finitely repeated games ⋮ Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games ⋮ On non-monotonic strategic reasoning ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy. ⋮ Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings ⋮ Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria ⋮ Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice ⋮ Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games

Cites Work

• Unanimity games and Pareto optimality
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

This page was built for publication: Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games