Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle
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Publication:918349
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90010-HzbMath0705.90003MaRDI QIDQ918349
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (12)
Arrovian aggregation of generalised expected-utility preferences: (im)possibility results by means of model theory ⋮ Weak independence and the Pareto principle ⋮ A representative individual from Arrovian aggregation of parametric individual utilities ⋮ Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization ⋮ Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem ⋮ Impossibility results for infinite-electorate abstract aggregation rules ⋮ The model-theoretic approach to aggregation: impossibility results for finite and infinite electorates ⋮ Multi-profile intergenerational social choice ⋮ A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle ⋮ Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis ⋮ Ultraproducts and aggregation ⋮ Aggregating infinitely many probability measures
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- A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Indivisible commodities and general equilibrium theory
- Smooth preferences and the approximate expected utility hypothesis
- Wilson's theorem for economic environments and continuous social preferences
- Myopic Economic Agents
- "Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom
- Equilibrium Analysis of Exchange Economies with Indivisible Commodities
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