Limit properties of equilibrium allocations of Walrasian strategic games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90020-KzbMath0705.90008MaRDI QIDQ918359

Joseph Sicilian, Yoshihiko Otani

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

closed graph propertyCournot-Nash equilibriumequilibrium allocationsWalrasian allocationsWalrasian strategic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS ⋮ Informational robustness of competitive equilibria. ⋮ Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions ⋮ Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets ⋮ Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies ⋮ College assignment as a large contest ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation ⋮ Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects ⋮ Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms

Cites Work

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• Duality and rationality
• Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach
• Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
• Strategic Equilibrium of Tariffs and General Equilibrium
• The Demand Theory of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Revealed Preference Theory

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