Revelation in informational dynamic settings

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90123-IzbMath0709.90007OpenAlexW2061900588MaRDI QIDQ922251

Roberto Burguet Verde

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90123-i

zbMATH Keywords

revelation principleprincipalprivate signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Implementation Theory

Cites Work

• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Arbitration of Two-party Disputes under Uncertainty
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

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