Comparative cooperative game theory
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Publication:922303
DOI10.1007/BF01761073zbMath0709.90105MaRDI QIDQ922303
Publication date: 1990
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (6)
STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION ⋮ The aggregate-monotonic core ⋮ New characterizations for largeness of the core ⋮ Stability and monotonicity in newsvendor situations ⋮ Minimal large sets for cooperative games ⋮ Monotonicity and Solidarity Axioms in Economics and Game Theory
Cites Work
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- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Cooperative games with large cores
- Convex games and extreme points
- Cores of convex games
- Cores of exact games. I
- Management versus Ownership, I
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