Communication between rational agents

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90055-OzbMath0709.90107OpenAlexW2144409969MaRDI QIDQ922304

Matthew Rabin

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90055-o

zbMATH Keywords

credible communicationCredible Message Rationalizabilitysimple communication games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (25)

A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Message exchange games in strategic contexts ⋮ Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games ⋮ Fragile meaning -- an experiment ⋮ Rationalizable signaling ⋮ Pragmatic reasoning about unawareness ⋮ Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games ⋮ Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society ⋮ Refining cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk ⋮ Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes ⋮ Validated equilibrium and sequential spatial competition games ⋮ Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets ⋮ A note on pre-play communication ⋮ Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining ⋮ Informal communication ⋮ Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ Evolutions of communication with partial common interest ⋮ Theories of coalitional rationality ⋮ Language, Games, and Evolution: An Introduction ⋮ Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions ⋮ Language and coordination games ⋮ The strategic role of nonbinding communication ⋮ Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games

Cites Work

• Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
• Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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