Threat bargaining games with a variable population

DOI10.1007/BF01753709zbMath0711.90098MaRDI QIDQ922975

Somdeb Lahiri

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumvariable populationequilibrium threat strategymultilateral stabilityself-enforceablethreat bargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cites Work

• Guarantee structures for problems of fair division
• Individual and collective opportunities
• Stability and the Nash solution
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• The Bargaining Problem
• Stability and Collective Rationality
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• Unnamed Item

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