Competitive equilibria and the grand coalition
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Publication:924931
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.11.002zbMath1135.91384OpenAlexW2009156860MaRDI QIDQ924931
Emma Moreno-García, Carlos Hervés-Beloso
Publication date: 29 May 2008
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.11.002
competitive equilibriumcontinuum economiesCore-Walras equivalencedominated allocationsgrand coalition
Related Items (10)
Core equivalences for equilibria supported by non-linear prices ⋮ Competitive equilibria and robust efficiency with club goods ⋮ Two characterizations of cost share equilibria ⋮ The veto mechanism in atomic differential information economies ⋮ Equilibrium theory under ambiguity ⋮ Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition ⋮ On restricted bargaining sets ⋮ Blocking efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information ⋮ On Vind's theorem for an economy with atoms and infinitely many commodities ⋮ Fairness and fuzzy coalitions
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- Lack of Pareto Optimal Allocations in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities: The Need for Impatience
- Myopic Economic Agents
- Nonatomic Economies and the Boundaries of Perfect Competition
- The Equality of the Core and the Set of Equilibria in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities and a Continuum of Agents
- Edgeworth-Allocations in an Exchange Economy with Many Traders
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
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