Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.03.002zbMath1135.91318OpenAlexW2165474621MaRDI QIDQ924941

Ning Sun, Zaifu Yang, Walter Trockel

Publication date: 29 May 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamescorec-coreendogenous coalition formationcompetitive outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (16)

Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations ⋮ Multicoalitional solutions ⋮ Joint games and compatibility ⋮ Axiomatizing core extensions on NTU games ⋮ Axiomatizing core extensions ⋮ Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies ⋮ Representation of transferable utility games by coalition production economies ⋮ A market interpretation of the proportional extended core ⋮ Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations ⋮ Reject and renegotiate: the Shapley value in multilateral bargaining ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On the importance of reduced games in axiomatizing core extensions ⋮ USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION ⋮ Autonomous coalitions

Cites Work

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• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
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