Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.06.006zbMath1135.91319OpenAlexW2059201184MaRDI QIDQ924944

Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 29 May 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.06.006

zbMATH Keywords

small group effectivenessclubslocal public goodsapproximate coregames with many playersNTU core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (8)

On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players ⋮ Allocation rules for coalitional network games ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games ⋮ The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players ⋮ Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment ⋮ Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games

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