Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry
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Publication:926188
DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0101-6zbMath1151.91015OpenAlexW2013417756MaRDI QIDQ926188
Publication date: 26 May 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0101-6
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