Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0230-yzbMath1154.91007OpenAlexW2148866170MaRDI QIDQ926202

Jens Josephson

Publication date: 26 May 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0230-y

zbMATH Keywords

Markov chainsbetter repliesstochastic adaptationweakly acyclic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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• Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Learning in games by random sampling

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