Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
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Publication:926207
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0235-6zbMath1147.91015OpenAlexW3121442808MaRDI QIDQ926207
Shigehiro Serizawa, Hiroki Saitoh
Publication date: 26 May 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13420
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