A generalization of Condorcet's jury theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0239-2zbMath1147.91008OpenAlexW2110082969MaRDI QIDQ926218

Ines Lindner

Publication date: 26 May 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0239-2

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet's Jury TheoremMajority gamesWeighted voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (1)

The importance of expertise in group decisions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A note on the Condorcet jury theorem with supermajority voting rules
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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