Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0256-1zbMath1151.91024OpenAlexW2041596968MaRDI QIDQ926229

Cristian M. Litan, Carlos González Pimienta

Publication date: 26 May 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0256-1

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumextensive form gamesequential equilibriumavoidable information setminimal subform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (2)

Estimation of finite sequential games ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension

Cites Work

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• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Sequential Equilibria
• The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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