A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis
From MaRDI portal
Publication:926233
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0262-3zbMath1147.91021OpenAlexW1978849015MaRDI QIDQ926233
Takehiko Yamato, Takahiro Watanabe
Publication date: 26 May 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0262-3
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (4)
Existence of perfect equilibria: a direct proof ⋮ Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings ⋮ On perfect Nash equilibria of polymatrix games ⋮ Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- On stability of perfect equilibrium points
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
- More on phantom bidding
- Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
This page was built for publication: A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis
