Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem
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Publication:926237
DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0268-XzbMath1146.91006OpenAlexW2136755165MaRDI QIDQ926237
Stergios Skaperdas, Alex Robson
Publication date: 26 May 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10072/44402
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Trade and expropriation ⋮ Persuasion as a contest ⋮ Conflict and competition over multi-issues ⋮ Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs
Cites Work
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- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- The Coase theorem is tautological, incoherent or wrong
- Contest success functions: an extension
- Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
- Contest success functions
- Asymmetric contests with general technologies
- Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
- An experimental study of the effect of private information in the Coase theorem
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