Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons
From MaRDI portal
Publication:926327
DOI10.1007/s10058-007-0035-2zbMath1152.91619OpenAlexW2065118311MaRDI QIDQ926327
Publication date: 27 May 2008
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0035-2
proportional solutionlabor sovereigntytriple implementationunknown and possibly overstated labor skills
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
- Nash implementation in production economies
- The proportional solution for economies with both private and public ownership
- A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies
- Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology
- Toward Natural Implementation
This page was built for publication: Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons