Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons

DOI10.1007/s10058-007-0035-2zbMath1152.91619OpenAlexW2065118311MaRDI QIDQ926327

Akira Yamada, Naoki Yoshihara

Publication date: 27 May 2008

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0035-2

zbMATH Keywords

proportional solutionlabor sovereigntytriple implementationunknown and possibly overstated labor skills

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
• Nash implementation in production economies
• The proportional solution for economies with both private and public ownership
• A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies
• Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology
• Toward Natural Implementation

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