Repeated implementation and complexity considerations

DOI10.1007/s10058-007-0034-3zbMath1152.91309OpenAlexW2032228730MaRDI QIDQ926328

Hannu Vartiainen

Publication date: 27 May 2008

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0034-3

zbMATH Keywords

repeated interactionNash implementationcommitment-freenesscomplexity considerations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
• Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining
• Long Cheap Talk
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• Voluntary implementation

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