Bargaining: Separately or together?

DOI10.1007/S10058-007-0037-0zbMath1152.91450OpenAlexW2104634843MaRDI QIDQ926329

Alp E. Atakan

Publication date: 27 May 2008

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0037-0

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingunionscoalition formationhold-up

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable ⋮ Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games ⋮ Buyer groups as strategic commitments

Cites Work

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• Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: The case of the nucleolus
• Monopoly, syndicate, and Shapley value: About some conjectures
• Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies
• Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts

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