Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
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Publication:926330
DOI10.1007/s10058-007-0038-zzbMath1153.91687OpenAlexW2062712230MaRDI QIDQ926330
Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Tommy Andersson
Publication date: 27 May 2008
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1387286
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (2)
Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages ⋮ Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
Cites Work
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- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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